

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF COLORADO**

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IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF)	
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO)	DOCKET NO. 11A-869E
FOR APPROVAL OF ITS 2011 ELECTRIC)	
RESOURCE PLAN)	

SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT TESTIMONY OF KURTIS J. HAEGER

ON

BEHALF OF

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO

February 13, 2012

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SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECT TESTIMONY OF KURTIS J. HAEGER

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1 (“CIEA”), Colorado Energy Consumers (“CEC”), and Thermo Power and
2 Electric LLC (“Thermo”), regarding the Company’s proposed Phase 2
3 evaluation process of the 2011 Electric Resource Plan (“2011 ERP”). I will
4 also provide additional information regarding the Company’s use of the “four-
5 source” blend gas price forecast and the use of gas price sensitivities to test
6 the robustness of the portfolios that will be developed in the Phase 2
7 competitive solicitation and bid evaluation process. In addition to my
8 supplemental direct testimony, Mr. Greg Ford will provide supplemental direct
9 testimony regarding the Company’s track record on constructing new gas-
10 fired generation while staying within the proposed budget. He will also
11 counter the claims made by CIEA that “PSCo has a long history of
12 unrealistically low estimates and subsequent overruns.” Mr. John Welch will
13 introduce the Company’s Winter Generation Adequacy Study and Report.
14 Mr. Jim Hill will demonstrate how the results of the Winter Generation
15 Adequacy Study will be factored into the Company’s Phase 2 bid evaluation
16 process. Mr. Chris Haworth will also provide supplemental direct testimony
17 on the current state of, and possible future changes to, the accounting
18 standards relating to Power Purchase Agreements (“PPA”) and the potential
19 financial impacts of these accounting standards.

1 current Independent Power Producers (“IPP”) have existing generation
2 resources which have been in service for a significant period of time and that
3 the IPP facilities have already completed at least one PPA cycle with the
4 Company. Utilizing these existing generation resources should provide the
5 Company the opportunity to acquire the necessary resources at a price that is
6 lower than developing a new greenfield generation project.

7 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE HOW THE COMPANY INTENDS TO EVALUATE**
8 **SELF-BUILD PROPOSALS AND OTHER BIDS OFFERED THROUGH THE**
9 **PHASE 2 COMPETITIVE SOLICITATION PROCESS.**

10 A. To begin, all self-build proposals offered by the Company will be submitted to
11 Public Service’s Resource Planning Department in a sealed package on the
12 day before the official bid submittal date. The Company’s self-build proposals
13 will remain sealed until all of the competing bids have been received.

14 The Company’s comparison of self-build proposals and other
15 proposals (that pass eligibility and economic screening) will focus on the
16 pricing and performance attributes of the power supplies being proposed.
17 Pricing attributes include facility construction costs, capacity payments,
18 transmission interconnection and delivery related costs, and certain O&M
19 costs. Performance attributes include heat rate, unit availability, fuel costs
20 and certain O&M costs. The Company describes in our 2011 ERP a
21 structured process for performing this evaluation. Public Service will apply
22 the evaluation process, including costs, etc., equally to all utility ownership
23 alternatives and to all other bids offered in the acquisition process.

1 The Company is also proposing to evaluate both our self-build
2 proposals and other proposals at their proposed cost. As discussed in
3 Volume 2 of the 2011 ERP, Page 2-328, Company proposals will be
4 represented to include the same power supply related costs and/or benefits
5 as those applied to bids made by other parties. Public Service is not
6 proposing to apply any risk adjustments to either utility-owned generation
7 alternatives or to other bid proposals.

8 **Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE A LITTLE MORE INSIGHT AS TO WHY THE**
9 **COMPANY IS NOT PROPOSING TO RISK ADJUST THE VARIOUS**
10 **GENERATION PROPOSALS AND ALTERNATIVES?**

11 A. Yes, when looking at the likely pool of generation alternatives, all of them
12 present some form of risk. This risk can present itself in the form of
13 performance risk associated with the construction of new alternatives,
14 operational risk for existing and new assets and their performance on critical
15 operational days, cost risk associated with cost estimates, future replacement
16 cost risk at the end of a PPA, financial risks associated with accounting rules
17 relating to PPAs, and risk associated with key model inputs and assumptions.
18 In contrast to CIEA's suggestion that only utility-owned alternatives have risk,
19 all alternatives that will be considered have some form of risk. I have outlined
20 in Table 1 some of the various risks that are inherent in the pool of expected
21 proposals that may compete to meet the Company's resource needs through
22 2018.

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Table KJH-1 Risks of Generation Alternatives

Power Purchase Agreement Risks	Utility Ownership Risks
Performance	Accuracy of cost estimate
Operations on critical days	Operations
Replacement cost at the end PPA	Future financing costs
Finance/Accounting treatment of PPA	

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3 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH PPAS AND HOW**
4 **PUBLIC SERVICE INTENDS TO INCORPORATE THOSE RISKS INTO THE**
5 **EVALUATION PROCESS?**

6 A. As listed in Table KJH-1, all generation options have risks. For PPA options,
7 there is the risk of performance associated with constructing the project on
8 time, the operational risk of being available on days the system needs the
9 generation the most, the risk associated with the replacement cost estimates
10 when the PPA reaches the end of the term (re-contracting), and the
11 financial/accounting risk associated with the possible accounting treatment of
12 PPAs. To reduce the risks associated with the performance and operational
13 risks, the Company has included security deposits and other conditions in the
14 PPAs to help manage those risks. In regards to the risk associated with the
15 accuracy of the cost estimate related to the re-contracting of the IPP or the
16 replacement of the generation at the end of the term of the PPA, the
17 Company uses our best forecast of future market costs in our evaluation. For
18 the financial/accounting issues related to imputed debt and capital lease

1 accounting, as described more fully by Public Service Witness Chris Haworth,
2 the Company is not proposing to make any adjustments in the bid evaluation
3 process so long as the accounting standards remain as they are today.

4 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE WHY THE COST OF RECONTRACTING OR**
5 **REPLACING THE GENERATION AT THE END OF THE TERM OF THE**
6 **PPA IS A RISK WORTHY OF CONCERN?**

7 A. When Public Service compares a PPA with a 15 or 25 year term, for example,
8 against a utility-owned resource that may last 40 to 50 years, the Company
9 must make assumptions of the cost of replacement generation at the time the
10 PPA is set to expire. Although Public Service makes our best estimate of
11 these future costs, ultimately the customer will bear the actual costs of either
12 a re-contracted PPA with the facility owner or the replacement generation.
13 Similar to the risk associated with the accuracy of the Company's cost
14 estimates of its new generation projects, the customer also bears the risk if
15 future generation costs, at the time of PPA term expiration, are higher than
16 the Company's estimate, or receives the benefit if future generation costs are
17 lower than the Company estimate. Since PPAs offer no protection against
18 the future cost of replacement generation beyond the PPA term, PPAs
19 inherently have more future cost risk in comparison to utility-owned assets
20 that are being depreciated over their 40 to 50 year life.

21 **Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE A LITTLE MORE INSIGHT AS TO WHY THE**
22 **COMPANY IS NOT PROPOSING TO RISK ADJUST THE VARIOUS**
23 **GENERATION PROPOSALS AND ALTERNATIVES?**

1 A. Yes, when looking at the expected generation options and the risks presented
2 by those options, Public Service believes that the current track record of both
3 the IPPs and utility-owned options have suggested that including a risk
4 adjustment for either option is not warranted at this time. Simply put,
5 everyone knows that planning resources over a 40 year period includes many
6 assumptions and incorporates numerous risks. When evaluating utility
7 ownership versus bids submitted in the acquisition process, both options
8 come with various risks and the Company has processes in place to manage
9 those risks.

10 **Q. HOW DOES THIS APPROACH COMPARE WITH CIEA'S**
11 **RECOMMENDATION?**

12 A. In the joint comments presented by CIEA, CEC and Thermo Power Electric
13 LLC, in response to Decision No. C11-1339, although they do not propose the
14 Company should risk adjust any of the IPP proposals, the joint respondents
15 suggest that Public Service should not be able recover any cost above the
16 Company's estimated or "bid" cost. In effect, the joint respondents are
17 recommending that the Company be held to a cap on the amount of cost that
18 we can recover through rates. In making their argument they suggest that
19 ratepayer cost exposure is capped when a PPA is selected and applying a
20 cost cap to a Public Service proposal amounts to a similar level of protection
21 for ratepayers.

1 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE JOINT RESPONDENTS' SUGGESTION THAT**
2 **A RATE CAP IS NECESSARY TO DISCIPLINE PUBLIC SERVICE'S COST**
3 **ESTIMATING PRACTICE?**

4 A. No. First of all, the joint respondents do not address the fact that if the actual
5 cost of generation comes in *lower* than the Company's cost estimate,
6 customers get to keep this benefit under a Company-owned option. With a
7 PPA, if the project costs end up being less than the cost assumed by the IPP
8 developer in setting the bid price, the IPP owner gets to keep the benefit. The
9 joint respondents also don't point out that the evaluation and cost recovery
10 methodology proposed by the Company allows for symmetrical treatment of
11 costs and benefits under both the PPA and utility ownership option. In a PPA
12 option, the developer gets to keep the benefits, or must pay for the additional
13 costs if the project comes in below or above their original bid price. Similarly,
14 customers get to keep the benefit if the Company's actual cost is less than
15 the original estimate, and may be asked to pay the incremental cost if the
16 prudently-incurred costs of the Company-owned resource are greater than
17 the original estimate.

18 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY GET TO AUTOMATICALLY RECOVER ANY**
19 **COSTS THAT ARE ABOVE THE ORIGINAL COST ESTIMATE?**

20 A. No, the Company must request recovery of these costs and must
21 demonstrate the prudence of those additional costs. Again, there is a process
22 in place to ensure the risk associated with the Company's cost estimating
23 activity is managed in a way to protect customers.

1 **Q. ARE THE JOINT REpondENTS CORRECT WHEN THEY STATE THAT**
2 **PUBLIC SERVICE HAS A LONG HISTORY OF UNDER-ESTIMATING**
3 **PROJECTS AND THEN REQUIRING RATEPAYERS TO PICK UP THE**
4 **COST OVERRUNS?**

5 A. No, as demonstrated by Public Service witness Greg Ford, the Company has
6 routinely demonstrated the ability to bring gas-fired generation projects in on
7 time and under budget.

8 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE TO THE JOINT RESPONDENTS' CRITICISM**
9 **OF THE COMPANY'S COST ESTIMATES ASSOCIATED WITH**
10 **COMANCHE 3 AND THE CLEAN AIR-CLEAN JOBS ACT PROJECTS?**

11 A. Greg Ford will briefly discuss the cost estimates and construction costs for
12 Comanche 3 and the Clean Air-Clean Jobs Act ("CACJA") projects in his
13 testimony. Public Service believes that it is premature to discuss the
14 Company's performance on the CACJA projects as none of the projects have
15 been completed. Concerning Comanche 3, while the construction of this vital
16 baseload resource was completed very nearly at estimated cost, the
17 Company is not contemplating offering to construct any new coal plants in this
18 proceeding. Thus I believe that neither Comanche 3 nor the CACJA projects
19 provide meaningful metrics by which to gauge whether the Company has
20 routinely demonstrated the ability to bring gas-fired generation projects in on
21 time and under budget.

1 **Q. HAS THE ISSUE OF EVALUATING UTILITY-OWNED PROJECTS AT**
2 **THEIR EXPECTED COST BEEN A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE IN PAST**
3 **RESOURCE PLANS?**

4 A. No. Public Service is proposing to use the same bid evaluation methodology
5 in this resource plan proceeding that has been approved by the Commission
6 in all prior resource plan proceedings. In addition, to ensure a fair and
7 equitable evaluation of all generation alternatives, the Commission will
8 employ an Independent Evaluator (“IE”) who will review the evaluation the
9 Company performs of Company self-build proposals and the IPP bids. The IE
10 will alert the Commission of any concerns with respect to the fairness of the
11 evaluation process.

12 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR OVERALL RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMISSION**
13 **CONCERNING RISK ADJUSTMENTS TO GENERATION PROPOSALS**
14 **AND COST CAPS?**

15 A. Since all bids include risk, the methodology proposed in this resource plan is
16 the same as the methodology that has been approved in all other resource
17 plan proceedings, there has not been significant issues with the evaluation of
18 utility-owned projects relative to PPAs in the past, and the Commission will
19 employ an Independent Evaluator to oversee the evaluation process, there
20 does not appear to be a compelling reason for the Commission to deviate
21 from the Company’s proposed evaluation process that has worked well in the
22 past.

23

III. GAS PRICE FORECAST AND THE USE OF SCENARIOS AND SENSITIVITIES

Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A BRIEF HISTORY ON HOW THE COMPANY CAME TO USE ITS CURRENT METHODOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING A GAS PRICE FORECAST AND ASSOCIATED SENSITIVITIES.

A. Over the past ten years, there has been continuing debate as to what is the appropriate natural gas forecast to use in resource evaluations. Over this period, the Commission has been provided a number of opinions by various parties as to whether the Company should utilize: a single independent forecast from a public source such as the Energy Information Administration (“EIA”); a gas price forecast from an individual intervening party; a New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”) quote; or, a combination of the above. Through these debates, the Company has proposed, and the Commission has approved the use of a long-term natural gas price forecast, comprised of a combination of four different forecast sources (the current blend being forecasts from Wood Mackenzie Research and Consulting, PIRA, IHS CERA and a NYMEX market quote). By not relying on one single source and also realizing that the forecast blend will stay more constant over the months that a resource plan proceeding will be conducted, the use of this methodology appears to have minimized individual biases while providing a reasonable basis for the Company’s evaluation and decision making process.

For resource planning processes gas price sensitivity analyses have been used to examine the robustness of the alternative resource plans, i.e., to

1 test if significant changes in the selected resource portfolios result when gas
2 price assumptions are changed. The disagreements concerning the testing of
3 resource portfolios against various sensitivities always tend to be derived
4 from a party's particular advocacy. Over the years, the Company has used a
5 sensitivity of increasing and decreasing gas costs by \$1, \$2 or even \$3 per
6 MMBtu or by one or two standard deviations. Unfortunately, the issue has
7 proved fertile ground for advocacy and debate as there does not appear to be
8 a magic answer for what is the appropriate range or the appropriate
9 methodology that should be used to develop the range. Many statistical
10 approaches utilize historical values to predict future price levels and or price
11 ranges. As we have witnessed over the last 15 years, basing forecasting
12 methodologies on historical pricing is not a very good method of analyzing
13 future price trends.

14 **Q. WHAT DOES THE COMPANY RECOMMEND AS THE APPROPRIATE**
15 **METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE RANGE OF GAS PRICES FOR THE**
16 **RESOURCE PLANNING ANALYSIS?**

17 A. Since the goal of the sensitivity analysis is to determine the inflection point
18 when a change in a certain assumption materially affects the outcome, I think
19 we have a fair amount of flexibility in selecting the appropriate range of
20 assumptions. The key to making this selection is the degree of
21 reasonableness that is provided by the range of the assumption and realizing
22 that we do not want to get into model paralysis by picking too many points to
23 analyze.

1 **Q. WHAT IS THE COMPANY'S VIEW ON USING SCENARIO ANALYSIS**
2 **INSTEAD OF SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS?**

3 A. Again, over the last ten years, getting the parties in the resource planning
4 dockets to even agree on a gas pricing methodology has been difficult.
5 Getting these parties to agree to a complete set of assumptions including
6 energy pricing, econometric drivers, emissions and emission requirements,
7 lifestyle patterns, technological advancements etc. that would be necessary to
8 truly develop a full blown scenario would likely be impossible. Public Service
9 suggests that if the Commission wanted to expand the sensitivity analysis to
10 scenario analysis, the Company should investigate acquiring fully developed
11 scenarios from one of the professional forecasting firms that offer this type of
12 service. Unfortunately these services generally provide their services on a
13 confidential basis to the subscribing party, as is the case with the gas
14 forecast. Yet, this appears to be the only efficient and cost-effective way to
15 obtain a fully developed set of scenarios. To minimize the cost impact and to
16 test the value of incurring such cost and investment in time, the Commission
17 may want to look at a pilot project that could test these issues over the next
18 couple of years and report back to the Commission in time for the next
19 resource plan filing.

20 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

21 A. Yes.